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JURISDICTION
This Appeal is from the final Judgement of the Tenth Circuit
Court, cases No. 87-TF-0004 and No. 87-CR-0008.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This Appeal is from the Final Orders of the Tenth Circuit
Court to review Court proceedings and possible right violations
and possible denial of Due Process, constituting reversable error
Case Number 87-TF-0004 in the Tenth Circuit Court is Docketed
in the Utah Court of Appeals as Number 870448-CA and concerns a
traffic citation for driving 70 mph in a 55 mph zone.
Case Number 87-CR-0008 in the Tenth Circuit Court is Dockete
in the Utah Court of Appeals as Number 870450-CA and concerns a
False Written Statement charge filed by the Kane County Attorney
against the Defendant and Appellant.
ISSUES OF APPEAL
I.

Do the Courts of the State of Utah have jurisdiction to

try an issue, when the State of Utah is a Party to the Action?
II.

When the Defend is denied COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE to

assist him with the proceedings before the courts of Utah, is
he denied due process und€>r the United States Constitution,
Amendments VI and, or under the Utah Constitution, Article I,
Section 12?
III. How many persons does it take to empanel a "COMMON
LAW JURY?
IV.

Can the Defendant be held in contempt of court for

demanding a Common Law Right such as a jury of 12?
V.

Can the Defendant be held in contempt of court for

informing the four person panal "Jury11, that the Defendant would
be held in contempt of court if he again requested a Jury of 12?
-5-

VI.

In a charge of contempt of court, can the trial judge

accuse, decide, and punish without violating the separation of
powers doctrine of the Utah Constitution and the United States
Constitution and, or without denying due process?
VII. Can the Court by Oath and Jury Instructions, deny the
Jury the right to try the Fact and the Law?
VIII. Is the Defendant denied Due Process when the members
of the jury do not understand or comprehend "Jury Lawlessness
or Jury Nullification"?
IX.

Is the Defendant denied Due Process of Law when the

court without cause, denies each and every jury instruction
submitted by the defendant?
X.

Is the Defendant denied due process when the Plaintiff

is given three times for final closing arguments and when the
Defendant is allowed only a single time for closing argument?
XI.

Has the Defendant been denied a Trial and, or Due

Process of Law, when it is impossible to determine what the
Defendant has been convicted of?
forked choice of finding guilt.

[When the Jury is given a
Is the Defendant convicted of

(1) Deceiving a Public Servant? or (2) Creating a false impression
--even if the statement is true?]
XII. Is the Defendant denied a fair trial and, or due
process of law under the U. S. and the Utah Constitutions when
the trial judge has a conflict of interest because he is the
public servant allegedly deceived?
XIII. Has the defendant been denied his rights under the
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 12,
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lf

to be confronted by

the witnesses against him/1

when the judge is the person

allegedly deceived, yet refuses to testify whether he was or
was not deceived by the Defendants Statement?
XIV. If Counsel of Choice is not present at sentencing, is
sentencing valid?
XV.

Does the courts denial of the Defendants written STAY

OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL without justifiable cause or reason
constitute denial of due process of lav/?
XVI. Did the trial court error when it imposed a jail
sentence upon the Defendant after conviction of a misdemeanor,
where at the trial

the defendant was not represented by counsel?

XVII. Is it Malicious Prosecution when the Plaintiff in this
suit was not damaged nor could he be damaged by the Defendants
statement, which statement is the subject of this action?
XVIII. Is a highway speed limit law, passed into law by the
legislature of the State of Utah a VOID and, or INVALID LAW if
it is passed only after receiving bribe blackmail letters from
the Federal Government through the Department of Transportation,
that the Federal Government would withhold highway funds if the
State failed to pass such law and inforce the same, when the
United States Constitution fails to grant to the Federal Government such rights as regulating the speed of travel of citizens
upon the Highway right-of-way?
XIX. Is the Defendant and Appellant bound by a Void or
Invalid Law?
XX.

Has the Defendant and Appellant been denied due process

of law when the judge acts as Prosecutor?
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REFERENCES AND AUTHORITIES
TO BE USED IN DECIDING EACH ISSUE OF APPEAL
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Article III, Section 2, Verse 2

"In all cases . . . in which a state shall be a party,
the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. 11
STATE v s . SUTTON, 63 Minn. 147:
"But it cannot be assumed that the framers of the
Constitution and the people who adopted it did not
intend that which is the plain import of the language
used. When the Language of the Constitution is
positive and free from all ambiguity, all courts are
not at liberty, by a resort to the refinements of
legal learning, to restrict its obvious meaning to
avoid hardships of particular cases, we must accept
the Constitution as it reads when its language is
unambigous, for it is the mandate of the sovereign
powers."
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH Article I, Section 3:
"The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the
Federal Union, and the Constitution of the United
States is the supreme law of the land."

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amendment V I :
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to. . .have the assistance of
Counsel for his defense."
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amendment XIV, Section 1:
"... No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any persons of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law;"
UTAH CONSTITUTION Article I, Section 12:
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,"
WILLIAM MALLOY vs. PATRICK J. HOGAN, 378 U.S. 1 (see page 1
GIDENN vs. WAINWRIGHT, 372 US 335:
"The right to Counsel at a criminal trial is deemed
so fundamental to the interests of justice that

denial therof automatically vitiates any conviction
obtained (The automatic reversal rule). This is
true even though their is no showing of any prejudice
or unfairness in the proceedings or any need for
having counsel.11
BURGETT vs. TEXAS, 389 US 109:
"A conviction obtained where the accused was denied
counsel is treated as void for all purposes."
MEMPHA vs RHAY, 389 US 128:
"The right to Counsel exists not only at the trial
thereof, but also "at every stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused
may be affected."
CHANDLER vs. FREGAG, 348 US 3:
"An accused must be allowed to employ Counsel of his
own choice and he must be given a reasonable opportunity to do so."
REYNOLDS vs. COCHRAN, 365 US 525:
"A state or federal court which arbitrarily refuses to
hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for
him in any case, civil or criminal, denies the party a
hearing, and therefore denies him due process of law
in the Constitutional sense."
JOHNSON vs. AVERY, 393 US 483, Justice Douglas concurring
opinion in reference to the preparation of petitions for
prison inmates, said:
"..., their preparation must never be considered the
exclusive prerogative of the lawyer. Laymen--in and
out of prison—should be allowed to act as "Next friend"
to any person in the preparation of any paper or document or claim, so long as he does not hold himself
out as practicing law or as being a member or the Bar."
RAILROAD TRAINMEN v. VIRGINIA STATE BAR, 377 US 1, at page 7:
"A State could not, by invoking the power to regulate
the professional conduct of attorneys, infringe in any
way the right of individuals and the public to be
fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress
to effectuate a basic public interest. Laymen cannot
be expected to know how to protect their rights when

-9-

dealing with practiced and carefully counseled
adversaries, cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335,
and for them to associate together to help one another
to preserve and enforce rights granted them under
federal laws cannot be condemned as a threat to legal
ethics. The State can no more keep these workers from
using their cooperative plan to advise one another than
it could use more direct means to bar them from resorting to the courts to vindicate their legal rights. The
right to petition the courts cannot be so handicapped.11
ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN, 407 US 25, 27.

(See Addendum page^Z-)

,f

The Sixth Amendment, which in enumerated situations
has been made applicable to the States by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment ...., provides specific standards
for "all criminal prosecutions.11
and on page 28:

(Addendum page S 3 )

"In Washington v. Texas, supra, we said, "We have held
that due process requires that the accused have the
assistance of counsel for his defense,"
Trial by Jury of 12, at common law.
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 2, Verse 3:
"The trial of all crimes, except in cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury;"
Amendment VI:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury ..."
Amendment VII:
"In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law."
Amendment XIV:

(See page 8 )

THOMPSON v. UTAH,

170

US 343, at 349

"...inquiry is whether the jury referred to in the
original Constitution and in the Sixth Amendment is
a jury constituted, as it was at common law, of
twelve persons, neither more nor less. 2 Hale's
P. C. 161; 1 Chitty's Cr. Law, 505. This question
must be answered in the affirmative."
-10-

Contempt of court for demanding jury of 12.
SIMMONS v. U.S. f 390 US 390:
"We find it intolerable that one constitutional right
should bo be surrendered in order to assert another. 11
MARBURY v. MADISON, 5, U.S. (ICranch) 137, 174,176:
"All laws which are repugnant to the Constitution are
null and void."
THOMPSON v. UTAH, 170 US 343, at 349
11

...inquiry is whether the jury referred to in the
original Constitution and in the Sixth Amendment is
a jury constituted, as it was at common law, of
twelve persons, neither more nor less. 2 Hale f s
P. C. 161; 1 Chitty's Cr. Law, 505. This question
must be answered in the af f irmative.ff
SHERAR vs. CULLEN, 481 F 2D 946:
"..There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon
one because of his exercise of constitutional rights."
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amendment VI (see page

10 )

Contempt of Court for informing Jury of Court order prohibiting defendant from requesting again a Jury of 12.
UTAH CONSTITUTION, Article I, Section 1:
"All men have the inherent and inalienable right...;
to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions,"
YICK WO v. HOPKINS, 118 US 356:
"For the very idea that one man may be compelled to
to hold his life, or the means of his living, or any
material right essential to the enjoyment of life,
at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable
in any country where freedom prevails, as being the
essence of slavery itself.

Mc HENRY v. STATE, 91 Miss. 562:
"One cannot be guilty of a contempt in refusing to
to order which the court has no power to make"

-1 1-

In Contempt charge, can judge accuse, decide and punish?
FISHER vs. PACE, 33 6 US 155 at 167:
"When the responsibilities of Lawmaker, Prosecutor
Judge, Jury, and disciplinarian are thrust upon a
Judge he is obviously incapable of holding the
scales of justice perfectly fair and true and reflecting impartially on the guilt or innocense of the
accused. He truly becomes the judge of his own cause.
The Defendant.... is thus denied an indispensable
element of the due process of Law.11
OFFUT vs U.S., 348 US 1 1 , at 1 4:
fl

It is not too heretical to suggest that a shift in
personnel is more calculated to insure fairness in the
trial of contempt cases, and that the mere donning of
judicial robes and the conscientiousness of an oath
long ago taken to succumb to more immediate emotional
demands."
Justice Frankfurter: "These are subtle matters, for
they concern the ingredients of what constitutes justice
Therefore, Justice must satisify the appearance of
justice."
FEDERALIST PAPER NO. 47, James Madison says:
"The accumulation of all powers, Legislative, executive,
and Judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few
or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or
elective, may be justly pronounced the very definition
of tyranny."
Can court deny Jury right to try FACT and LAW?
UTAH CONSTITUTION, Article I, Section 15:
"; and the jury shall have the right to determine
the law and the fact."
Due Process - do not understand jury lawlessness or jury
nullification.
STATE vs. CROTEAU, 23 VT 14, 54 AM:
"The common law right of the jury to determine the
Law as well as the Facts remains unimparied."
U.S. vs. DOUGHERTY, 473 F 2D 1113, 1139
As the US court of appeals for the District of
Columbia has acknowledged, that the Jury has
"...an unviewable and unreversible power....to
-12-

acquit in disregard of the instructions of the law
given by the trial judge.11
US vs MOYLAN, 417 F 2D, 1002, 1006:
fl

We recognise, as appellants urge, the undisputed
power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is
contrary to the law as given by the judge, and
contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must
exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in
criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the
minds of jurors to find the basis upon which they
judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the
defendant is accused is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for
any reason which appeals to their logic or passion,
the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must
abide by the decision."
MCGUTHRIE vs STATE, 17 GA 497:
"In criminal cases, the Jury are Judges of the law
as well as of the facts; and it is error in the court
to restrict them to the law as given in charge by the
court."
IX.

Is due process denied when court denies defendants jury
instructions?
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE vs. CENTRAL RQIG REFINING CO.,
338 US 604:
"The guaranty of due process reflects traditional
notions of justice."

X.

Due process - Plaintiff 3 times for closing argument.

XI.

Denial of trial and due process - forked conviction.
GOTKIN vs MILLER, 514, F.. 2d 125 C. A. N.Y.:
"Due process clause not only applies when ones
physical liberty is threatened but also where a
persons good name, reputation, honor or integrity
are at stake."

XII. Due process - conflict of interest
IN RE MURCHISON, 349 US 133:
"The due process inhibition on judges who are interested
in proceedings applies to state officers as well, by
the application of the fourteenth amendment."
-13-

XIII. Judge refuses to testify of being deceived.
WILLIAM MALLOY vs PATRICK J. HOGAN, 378 US 1:
"The United States Supreme Court stated further that
all rights and safeguards contained in the first
eight amendments to the federal constitution are
equally applicable in every state criminal action,
"Because a denial of them would be a denial of due
process of law."
XIV. Counsel at sentencing
KUEHNERT v. TURNER, 28 U 2d 150, 499 P 2d 839:
Defendants sentence was invalid where he was not
represented by counsel at sentencing and record
did not show waiver of right to counsel at time of
sentencing.
XV.

Due process - deny stay of execution.

XVI. Jail sentence with out counsel at trial.
ARGERSIGNER vs. HAMLIN SHERIFF, 407 US 25: (Addendum page */JL )
"We hold therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial."
The denial of the assistance of counsel will preclude
the imposition of a jail sentence."
"Under the rule we announce today, every judge will
know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that
no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law
permits it, unless the accused is represented by
counsel."
XVII. Malicious Prosecution
XVIII. Speed limit law void or invalid?
MARBURY v MADISON, 5 us (1Cranch) 137.
XIX.
XX.

(See page

11 )

Is the Defendant and Appellant bound by a Void or invalid law?
Due Process - when judge acts as Prosecutor?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Case 870448-CA was numbered R7-TF-0004 in the Tenth Circuit
Court.
On tuesday, the 24th day of February, 1987, Utah highway
Patrolman Harmon F. Robertson issued the defendant/Appellant a
speeding citation for driving 70 MPH in a 55 MPH zone.

The

Kanab Justice of the Peace Dennis Mosdell transferred the case
to be tried in the Tenth Circuit Court of Utah before Judge
David L. Mower.

On the 10th day of July, 1987, a panal of 4

persons tried the defendant/Appellant and returned a guilty
verdict.

Sentencing was on the 14th day of August at which time

the Defendant/Appellant was sentenced to be fined the sum of
Sixty-five Dollars ($65.00).
execution was denied.

The defendant/Appellants stay of

The appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals

was filed on the 14th day of September with the trial court.

Case 870450-CA was numbered 87-CR-0008 in the Tenth Circuit
Court.
On the 24th day of April, 1987, the Kane County Attorney
Jim R. Scarth, filed an information against the Defendant/Appellar
charging him with a "WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT11.

Such statement

was filed in a traffic case then pending before the Tenth Circuit
Court, and contained statements that the defendant had no legal
and lawful money under the United States Constitution, Article I,
Section 10.

A panal of 4 persons tried the Defendant/Appellant

on July 10, 1987 and returned a verdict of guilty.
1987

On August 14,

judge Mower sentenced the defendant/Appellant to be confined

-15-

and imprisoned in the Kane County Jail for a term of (60) days
and fined the sum of Four Hundred Dollars ($400,00), together
with a 25% surcharge of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00).

Then

further ordered that fifty (50) days of the jail sentence be
suspended.
Judge Mower also charged the Defendant/Appellant with
contempt and sentenced the Defendant/Appellant to be confined
in jail for ten (10) days to run concurrently with the jail term
imposed for the offense of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT and further
fined the sum of three hundred dollars ($300.00)..
The Defendant/Appellant was forwith jailed and judge Mower
denied the defendants written stay of execution pending appeal.
The Defendant/Appellant was confined in the Kane County Jail
from 14 August, 1987 until the 24th day of August, for a total
of 10 days confinement.

Citation

to the record

At the time of the writing of this Brief the Defendant/
Appellant was without access to the record or transcript of
proceedings held before the Trial Court.

Even though he has

made a timely request for such transcript.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Defendant/Appellant contends that:
lacked jurisdiction in this case.

The trial court

The Defendant was denied

COUNSEL OF HIS CHOICE at each and every hearing before the
trial court.

That the Defendant/Appellant was denied his

right to a common law jury of 12 persons.

That

he was

wrongfully held in contemptof court for violating a court
order, when there was in fact no violation.
-16-

The Defendant/Appellant further contends that he was denied
due process of law by:

The trial court in being the accusor,

judge, jury, and in determining punishment in a Contempt charge.
The trial court denying the "jury" the right to try the law and
when the "jury" does not understand Jury Lawlessness or Jury
nulification.

The trial court denying the Defendant/Appellants

jury instructions.

The trial court in allowing the Plaintiff an

extra time for closing arguments.

The trial court when it

instructed the jury to find guilt through a forked instruction,
thus preventing the Defendant/Appellant from knowing what he has
been found guilty of.

The trial judge having a conflict of

interest because he is the person allegedly deceived.

The

trial judges refusal to testify to the fact of whether he was
deceived by the Defendant/Appellants statement.
The Defendant/Appellant further contends that:

Sentencing

was not valid since counsel of Choice was not present at sentenci:
The Courts denial of Stay of Execution Pending Appeal was a denia
of due process.

The trial court errored when it sentenced

the Defendant/Appellant to a term in the county jail, when the
Defendant/Appellant was denied Counsel of choice at the time of
trial.

This case was Malicious Prosecution as the Prima Facia

case failed at the time the information was filed.

The highway

speed limit law is invalid and void as it was passed only after
threats from the Federal government of withholding funds.
that no one is bound by such law.

And

And that the Defendant and

Appellant has been denied due process of law when the judge acts
as Prosecutor.
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

The Jurisdiction issue is number I.
The United States Constitution clearly states:

ff

In all

cases....in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction."

Article III, Section 2, Verse 2.

The information and complaints all listed "THE STATE OF UTAH n
as the plaintiff, thus the state Is a party.
"We must accept the Constitution as it reads when its language
is unambigous"

STATE v. SUTTON, 63 Minn. 147.

"The constitution of the United States is the Supreme law
of the land."

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, Article I, Section 3.

Therefore these cases should be reversed from lack of jurisdiction as mandated by the federal constitution.
II.

COUNSEL OF CHOICE is issue II.
The Utah Constitution

in Article I, Section 12 states:

"in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel"
The United States Constitution Amendment VI, where it
proclaims "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to...have the assistance of Counsel for his
defense." is made applicable to the State of Utah by the XIV
Amendment.
"The right to Counsel at a criminal trial is deemed so
fundamental to the interests of justice that denial thereof
automatically vitiates any conviction obtained (The automatic
reversal rule).

This is true even though their is no showing of

any prejudice or unfairness in the proceedings or any need for
having counsel."

GIDENN v. WAINRIGHT, 372 US 335
-18-

"A conviction obtained where the accused was denied counsel
is treated as void for all purposes."

BURGETT v. TEXAS, 389 US 1

"A state or federal court which arbitrarily refuses to hear a
party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him in any case,
civil or criminal, denies the party a hearing, and therefore deni<
him due process of law in the Constitutional sense."
Even laymen are permitted to practice law by JOHNSON v.
avery, 393 US 483 and RAILROAD TRAINMENT V. VIRGINIA STATE BAR.
377 US 1.
The Defendant and Appellant was denied Counsel at each and
every hearing before the trial court.

(See pages Vv f 70J

Therefore the convictions should be reversed.
III. How many persons does it take to empanel a Common Law Jury?
The Defendant and Appellant has demanded a jury under the
common law as provided for in the United States Constitution,
Article III, Section 2, Verse 3. Also under Amendment VI and VII,
And the dicta in Thompson v. Utah, clearly shows that a "Sixth
Amendment" jury is "twelve persons, neither more nor less."
Therefore the convictions should be reversed for failure
of the court in providing a 12 person Jury.
IV.

Can the Defendant be held in contempt for demanding a

Common Law Right such as a jury of 12?
Tompson v. Utah, states that a Sixth Amendment Jury is of
12 persons and the Sixth Amendment is applied to the State Courts
by the XIV Amendment.
Therefore the Defendant Appellant has the right to demand
a Sixth Amendment Jury, Which he did by written motion,which was
denied, (see page 5*/ £ G"&)
-19-

Also considering that "...there can be no sanction or penalty
imposed upon one because of his exercise of Constitutional rights.11
Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F 2D 946.
V.

Can the Defendant and appellant be held in contempt for

informing the panal of 4 "Jury" of the courts order for the
Defendant and Appellant to not request a 12 person jury again?
The Trial court on June 11, 1987:

"IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER

OF THE COURT that the Defendant's Demand for Venirement to Number
Twelve be, and the same is hereby denied.

The Defendant will be

found in contempt and the Court will consider fining him if this
request is made again.11 (See P*^

"•

On the date of trial the defendant made a statement to the
Panal of 4 "jury" that the judge had denied the Defendent and
Appellants request for a common law jury of twelve members.
Such a statement cannot be construed to be a request as
the Defendant was comunicating with the Panal of 4 "jury" and
as they had no power to provide a common law jury of 12 persons.
Only the judge could have provided a jury of 12, But the Defendant
was not speaking to the judge.

Furthermore the judge made no

attempt to stop such communication.
Can a statement be considered a request?
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 1:

"All men have

the inherent and inalienable right ...; to communicate freely
their thoughts and opinions," and the case of Sherar vs Cullen,
481 F 2d 946,

the exercise of a constitutional right can bring

no sanctions.
Therefore the charge of contempt should be reversed.
-20-

VI.

In contempt charge can judge accuse, decide, and punish

without violating the separation of powers doctrine and without
denying due process?
The judge "becomes the judge of his own cause.

The

Defendant...is thus denied an indespensable element of the due
process of Law.11

Fischer vs. Pace, 336 US 155 at 167

"Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.11

Offut

vs U.S., 348 US 11, at 14
James Madison calls it: "the very definition of tyrany."
Federalist Paper No. 47.
Also, Argersigner v. Hamlin, 407 US 25, prohibits a jail
sentence when the defendant is not represented by counsel.
Therefore the Judge did error by failing to bring his
complaint of contempt before another judge.
VII.

Can the Court by Oath and Jury Instructions, deny the

Jury the right to try the fact and the law?
"...; and the jury shall have the right to determine the
law and the fact."

Utah Constition, Article I, Section 15.

Jury instruction # 1 "It is your duty to follow the law
regardless of what you believe it is or ought to be."
"It is your exclusive right and responsibility to determine
the facts...

( see Addendum page

The jury instruction is in opposition of the constitution
therefore the Defendant and Appellant has been denied due process.
VIII. Is due process denied when the members of the jury do not
understand Jury Lawlessness or Jury Nullification?

-21-

At the time of vordire the members of the jury were asked
if they understood Jury Lawlesness or Jury nullification.

The

Judge and the prosecuting attorney both did not know what it
meant and there was no reply from the prospective jurors.
"The common law right of the jury to determine the law
as well as the facts remains unimparied.ff

State vs. Croteau,

23 VT 14, 54 AM.
Also:

US. vs. DOUGHERTY, 473 F 2D 1113, 1139;

MOYLAN, 417 F 2D, 1002, 1006.;

US vs.

MCGUTHRIE vs. STATE, 17 GA 497

It is the Defendant and Appellants contention that due
process assumes jurys right to try the facts and the law, and
that those rights are known by the members of the jury.
IX.

Is the Defendant denied Due process of Law when the court

without cause, denies each of the jury instructions submitted
by the Defendant and Appellant?
The defendant and Appellant submitted Five jury instructions
that were hand written on yellow note pad paper.

(See PaqeSS^-S^

)

"The guaranty of due process reflects traditional notions
of justice."

SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE vs CENTRAL ROIG REFINING CO,

338 US 604.
Did the court error in denying these jury instructions?
X.

Is the Defendant denied due process when the Plaintiff is

given three times for final closing arguments and when the
Defendant is allowed only a single time for closing argument?
When the Plaintiff and Respondant concluded it preliminary
closing argument, the Judge remembered that he had forgotten
to give the jury instructions, so the judge immediately gave the
-22-

jury its instructions and then returned the floor to the
Plaintiff and Respondant even though he had rested his case.

XI.

Has the Defendant been denied a Trial and, or Due Process

of Law, when it is impossible to determine what the Defendant has
been convicted of?
finding guilt.

When the Jury is given a forked choice of

Is the Defendant convicted of (1) Deceiving a

Public Servant? or (2) Creaiting a false impression-- even if the
happens to be true?

(see jury instruction #21 on page (>X & (&

)

Also in consideration of GOTKIN vs MILLER. 514, F. 2d 125.
XII. Is the Defendant denied a fair

"trial and, or due process

of law under the U. S and the Utah Constitutions when the trial
judge has a conflict of interest because he is the public servant
allegedly deceived?
"The due process inhibition on judges who are interested in
proceedings applies to state officers as well, by the application
of the fourteenth amendment. 11
XIII. Has the defendant been denied his rights under the Utah
Constitution Article I, Section 12,
the witnesses against him,"

"to be confronted by

when the judge is the person

allegedly deceived, yet refuses to testify whether he was or
was not deceived by the Defendants Statement?
also in consideration of WILLIAM MALLOY vs.PATRICK J. HOGAN,
378 US 1.

XIV.

If Council of Choice is not present at sentencing, is

sentencing valid?
"Defendant's sentence was invalid where he was not represente
by counsel at sentencing and record did not show waiver of right
-23-

to counsel at time of sentencing.11

KUEHNERT v. TURNER, 28 U 2d 150,

499 P 2d 839.
XV,

Does the courts denial of the Defendants written Stay of

Execution Pending appeal without justifiable cause or reason
constitute denial of due process of law?
At the time of sentencing the Plaintiff and judge expressed
their feelings that the Defendant and Appellant would not serve
jail time if he was not incarcerated immediately.
was in part from

This feeling

the Defendants informing the Court the

ARGERSIGNER vs HAMLIN SHERIF, 407 US 25, case which states:
"Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the
trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed,
even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented
by counsel."
Also considering the fact that the Defendant and Appellant
had been denied counsel at and before trial.

(see Pages n j f *° )

XVI. Did the trial court error when it imposed a jail
sentence upon the defendant after conviction of a misdemeanor
where at the trial, the defendant was not represented by counsel?
"We hold therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent
wavier, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony."

"The denial of

the assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of a jail
sentence."

"Under the rule we announce today, every judge will

know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment
may be imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the
accused is represented by counsel."
-24-

And it can be shown from the record

that the defendant

and Appellant was denied council of his choice. (See Page
Therefore the trial court did error in sentencing the
defendant to a term of jail when there was no council at the
trial.
XVII.

Is it Malicious Prosecution when the Plaintiff in this

suit was not damaged nor could he be damaged by the Defendant
and Appellants statement, which statement is the subject of
this action?
XVIII.

[see Affidavit of Poverty on page 4/$ . ]

Is a highway speed limit law passed into law by the

legislature of the State of Utah a Void and, or Invalid Law if
it is passed only after receiving bribe blackmail letters from
the Federal Government through the Department of Transportation,
that the Federal Government would withhoLd hfghway funds if the
State failed to pass such law and inforce the same, when the
United States Constitution

fails to grant to the Federal Govern-

ment such rights as regulating the speed of travel of citizens
upon the Highway right-of-way?
This in considering MARBURY V. MADISON,
XIX.

5 US (Cranch) 137

Is the Defendant and Appellant bound to obey a void or

invalid law?
XX.

Can the Defendant and Appellant been denied due process

of law when the judge acts as Prosecutor?

Such as when the

Prosecutor rests his case and forgets an important part of the
Primefacia case so the judge calls both parties to the bench
(away from the recorder microphone) to let the Prosecutor know
of the defect.
-25-

CONCLUSION

The trial court has committed reversable error and therefore
the Defendant/Appellant requests this court to reverse the
convictions and sentences imposed by the trial court in the
Charge and conviction of "FALSE WRITTEN STATEMENT, and in the
conviction of speeding 70 MPH in a 55 MPH zone, and further asks
this court to reverse the charge of contempt of court.
And further relief sought is:

a reimbursement for expenses

of travel from my residence to Kanab, Utah for numerous court
appearances and cost of paperwork amounting to $250.00.
And for lost revenue while the Defendant/Appellant was
incarcerated in the Kane County Jail from trucking operation
amounting to $4,800.00.
And for any other punitive damages the court sees fit.
And further asks this court to remove the record of the
speeding 70 MPH in a 55 MPH zone from the driving record of
the Defendant/Appellants record as kept by the Utah Drivers
license division.
Dated this 24th day of April, 1988.

cdj^yf^^/o^—Arden M. Barlow in Propria Persona
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing CONSOLIDATED BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT by depositing
the same in the United States Mail, Postage Prepaid to the followi
Kane County Attorney, Court House
70 North Main.
Kanab, Utah

Dated this

P. 0. Box 670

84741

*?$" day of April, 1988.

By < ^ ^ L ^ ^Sa^4^-
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ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN, SHERIFF
CERTIORARI TO T H E S U P R E M E COURT OF FLORIDA

No. 70-5015

Argued December 6, 1971—Reargued February 28,
1972—Decided June 12, 1972

The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to the assistance of counsel, which is guaranteed "by the Sixth Amendment as
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, is not governed by the classification of the
offease or by whether or not a jury trial is required. No accused
may be deprived of his liberty as the result of any criminal prosecution, whether felony or misdemeanor, in which he was denied
the assistance of counsel In this case, the Supreme Court of
Florida erred in holding that petitioner, an indigent who was tried
for an offense puni>hablc by imprisonment up to six months, a
SI,MO fine, or both, and given a 90-day jail sentence, had no right
to court-appointed counsel, on the ground that the right extends
onl\ io trial?2 "for non-potty offences punishable by more than six
months imprisonment '• Pp 27—10
236 So 2d 442, renewed
DOUGHS.

\\x,

STEW

BRENNXN,

J . dclnered the opinion of the Court, in which B R E N \RI
Winn
M V R S H \ L L , and B U C K M U N , JJ., joined.
J fih^l i <oi,Mining opinion, in which DOUGLAS and

S n \ \ \ R i , .1.1 joined ,)nst p 10
Bi RC.ER, C J , filed an opinion
concurring in tin n nit j>t>st p 41
Po\s ELL, J , filed an opinion
concurring m t h e r c - u h , m which R K H N Q L ' L ^ T , J , joined, post. p. 44

Brua S. Ro(joir aigued the cause for petitioner on the
reargument and ,/ Michael Shea argued the cause pro
hoc vice on the original argument. With them on the
brief was P. A Huhbart.
George R. Gcorgitj], Assistant Attorney General of
Florida, reargued the cause for respondent. With him
on the brief weir Robert L. Shcvin, Attorney General,
and Raymond L Murky, Assistant Attorney General
joined by the Attorneys General for* their respective
Mates as follows Gan( K Kelson of Arizona, Arthur K.
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Bolton of Georgia, If7. Anthony Park of Idaho, ./acA: P .
F. Gremillion of Louisiana, James S. Erwin of Maine,
Robert L. Woodahl of M o n t a n a , Robert List of Nevada,
Robert Morgan of N o r t h Carolina, //e/pi Johanncsou of
N o r t h Dakota, and Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina.
Solicitor General Grisivold argued the cause for the
United States as amicus curiae on the rcargument urging
reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant
Attorney
General Petersen, Deputy Solicitor General
GreenawalL,
Harry R. Saclise, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Sidney
M.
Glazer.
Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed by
William E. Heller stein for the Legal Aid Society of New
York, and by Marshall J. Hartman for the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association.
Lauren Beasley, Chief Assistant Attorney General of
Utah, filed a brief for the Attorney General of Utah as
amicus curiae urging affirmance.
Briefs of amici curiae were "filed by John E.
Hnvelock,
Attorney General, for the State of Alaska, and by Andrt w
P. Miller, Attorney General, and Van-n H. Lejcoc Assista n t Attorney General', for the Commonwealth of Virginia.
MR.

JUSTICE

DOUGLAS

delivered

the opinion of the

Court.
Petitioner, an indigent, was charged in Florida with
carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by imprisonment up to six months, a SI,000 fine, or both. T h e
trial was to a judge, and petitioner was unrepresented by
_counseL H e was sentenced to serve 90 days in jail, and
brought this habeas corpus action in the Florida Supreme
Court, alleging that, being deprived of his right to counsel,
he was unable as an indigent layman properly to raise and
present to the trial court good and sufficient defenses to'
the charge for which he stands convicted. The Florida
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Supreme Court by a four-to-three decision, in ruling on
the right to counsel, followed the line we marked out in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 159, as respects the
right to trial by jury and held that the right to courtappointed counsel extends only to trials "for non-petty
offenses punishable by more than six months imprisonment." 236 So. 2d *442, 443.1
The case is here on a petition for certiorari, which
we granted. 401 U. S. 908. pWe reverse.]
The Sixth Amendment, which in enumerated situations
has been made applicable to the States by reason of the
Fourteenth Amendment (see Duncan v. Louisiana, supra;
Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14; Kloyfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U. S. 213; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400:
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335: and In re Oliver,
333 U. S. 257), provides specified standards foij| "all
criminal prosecutions." )
1

For a survey of the opinions of judges, prosecutors, and defenders
concerning the right to counsel of persons charged with misdemeanors, see 1 L. Silverstein. Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases
in American State Courts 127-135 (1965).
A review of federal and state decisions following Gideon is contained in Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v.
Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 Creighton L. Rev. 103 (1970).
Twelve States provide counsel for indigents accused of "serious
crime" in the misdemeanor category. Id., at 119-124.
Nineteen States provide for the appointment of counsel in most
misdemeanor cases Id , at 121-133 One of these is Oregon, whose
Supreme Court said in Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. 94, 100101, 458 P. 2d 414, 41<S,<^' If our objective is to insure a fair trial ^
in every criminal prosecution the need for counsel is not determined by the seriousness of the crime The assistance of counsel
will best avoid conviction of the innocent—an objective as important in the municipal court as in a court of general jurisdiction.'^
California's requirement extends to traffic violations. Blake v.
Municipal Court, 242 Cal App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771.
Overall, 31 States have now extended the right to defendants
charged with crimes less serious than felonies. Comment, Right
to Counsel, supra, at KU
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One is the requirement of a "public trial/' In re
Oliver, supra, held that the right to a "public trial"
was applicable to a state proceeding even though only
a 60-day sentence was involved. 333 U. S., at 272.
Another guarantee is the righjbjto be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation. Still another, the
right of confrontation. Pointer v. Texas, supra. And,
another, compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
one's favor. Washington v. Texas, supra. We have
never limited these rights to felonies or to lesser but
serious offenses.
In Washington v. Texas, supra, we said, "We have
held that due process requires that the accused have
the assistance of counsel for his defense, that he be
confronted with the witnesses against him, and that he
have the right to a speedy and public trial." 388 U. S.,
at 18. Respecting the right to a speedy and public
trial, the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, the right to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses, it was recently stated, "It is simply
not arguable, nor has any court e\ei hold, that the trial
of a petty offense may be held in secret, or without notice
to the accused of the charges, or (hat in such cases the
defendant has no right to confront his accusers or to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf."
Junker, The Right to Counsel m Misdemeanor Cases,
43 Wash. L. Rev. 6S5. 705 HOnS)
District of Columbia v. CUncans, 300 U. S. 617, illustrates the point. There, the offence was engaging without a license in the business of dealing m second-hand
property, an offense punishable by a fine of $300 or
imprisonment for not more than 00 days. The Court
held that the offense was a "petty" one and could be
tried without a jury. But the conviction was reversed

^3S-
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and a new trial ordered, because the trial court had prejudicially restricted the right of cross-examination, a right
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment^
The right to trial by jury, also guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment by reason of the Fourteenth, was
limited by Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, to trials where
the potential punishment was imprisonment for six
months or more. But, as the various opinions in Bald"win v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, make plain, the right to
trial by jury has a different genealogy and is brigaded
with a system of trial to a judge alone. As stated in
Duncan:
"Providing an accused with the right to be tried
by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or ojyerzealous prosecutor
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.
If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps
less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he
was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect
a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power—-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers
over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge
or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power,
so typical of our State and Federal Governments in
other respects, found expression in the criminal law
in this insistence upon community participation in
the determination of guilt or innocence. <The deep
commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial
in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies for protection under f
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and must therefore bo respected by the
)
States.^ Ml TJ. fi., at 156.
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While there is historical support for limiting the
"deep commitment'' to trial by jury to "serious criminal cases," 2 there is no such support for a similar limitation on the right to assistance of counsel:
"Originally, in England, a person charged with
treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel,
except in respect of legal questions which the accused himself might suggest. At the same time
parties in civil cases and persons accused of misdemeanors were entitled to the full assistance of
counsel. . . .
" [ I t ] appears that in at least twelve of the
thirteen colonies the rule of the English common law, in the respect now under consideration, had been definitely rejected and the right
to counsel fully recognized in all criminal prosecutions, save that in one or two instances the right
was limited to capital offenses or to the more serious
crimes . . . ." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 60.
6^-65.
The Sixth Amendment thus extended the right to
counsel beyond its common-law dimensions. But there
is nothing in the language of the Amendment, its history,
or in the decisions of this Court, to indicate that it was
intended to embody a retraction of the right in petty
offenses wherein the common law previously did require
that counsel be provided. See James w Headley, 410
F. 2d 325, 331-332, n. 9.
We reject, therefore, the premise that since prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than
2

See Frankfurter A, Corcoran, Petty
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury,
982 (1926) ; James v. Headley, 410 F. 2d
Offender^ Have No P e e r s ' , 2(3 U Chi L

Federal Offenses and the
39 Harv. L. Rev. 917, 980-;
325, 331. Cf. Kaye, Petty
Pev 215 (1959)
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six months may be tried without a jury, they may also
be tried without a lawyer.
The assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the
very existence of a fair trial. The Court in Powell v.
Alabama, supra, at 68-69—a capital case—said:
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is
incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without
a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be
not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how
much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate,
or those of feeble intellect/'
In Gideon v. Wainwright, supra (overruling Betts v.
Brady, 316 U. S. 455), we dealt with a felony trial.
But we did not so limit the need of the accused for a
lawyer. We said:
" [ I ] n our adversary system of criminal justice,
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire
a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an
obvious truth. Governments, both state and fed-
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eral, quite properly spend vast sums of money to
establish machinery to try defendants accused of
crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed
essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants
charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire
t h e best lawyers they can get to prepare and present
their defenses. T h a t government hires lawyers to
prosecute and defendants who have the money hire
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of
t h e widespread belief t h a t lawyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries. T h e right of one
charged with crime to counsel m a y n o t be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some^
countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws
h a v e laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant
stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime
has to face his accusers wit hunt a lawvor to assist
him." 372 U. S., at 344.
Both Powell and Gideov involved felonies But thenrationale has relevance to any criminal trial, where an
accused is deprived of his liberty. Powell and Gideon
suggest t h a t there are certain fundamental rights applicable to all such criminal prosecutions, even those, such
3

See also Johrison v Zcrbst, 304 V S }."><: 402-4'»V
" [ T h e Sixth Amendment] embodies a reah-tie recognition of the
obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal --kill to protect hnn-elf when brought before a tribunal with power to take lu< life or liberty wherein the prosecution
Ls [ r e p r e s e n t e d by experienced and learned roundel
That which i^
simple, orderly and necessary to the lawver to the untrained lavrnan
may appear intricate, complex and rn\ N r ou^ "
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as In re Oliver, supra, where the penalty is 60 days'
imprisonment:
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his
defense—a right to his day in court—are basic in
our system pf jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be
represented by -counsel."
333 U. S., a t 273 (em^phasis supplied).
T h e requirement of counsel may well be necessary
for a fair trial even in a petty-offense prosecution. We
are by no means convinced t h a t legal and constitutional
questions involved in a case t h a t actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex
t h a n when a person can be sent off for six m o n t h s or m o r e . /
See, e. g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514; Thompson v.
Louisville, 362 U. S. 190; Shuttlesworth
v.
Birmingham,
382 U. S. 87.
T h e trial of vagrancy cases is illustrative. While only
brief sentences of imprisonment may be imposed, the
cases often bristle with thorny constitutional questions.
SeePaTKLchristou v. Jacksonville, 405 IT, S. 156.
In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, dealt with juvenile delinquency and an offense which, if committed by an
adult, would have carried a fine of $5 to $50 or imprisonment in jail for not more than two m o n t h s (id.y at 29),
b u t which when committed by a juvenile might lead
to his detention m a state institution until he reached
the age of 21. Id , at 36-37. We said (id., at 36) t h a t
" f t ] h e juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope
with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the
facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to
ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and
submit it. T h e child Vequires the guiding hand of coun-
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sel at every step in the proceedings against him/ " citing
Powell v. Alabama. 287 U. S.T at 69. The premise of
Gault is that even in prosecutions for offenses less serious
than felonies, a fair trial may require the presence of a
lawyer.
Beyond the problem of trials and appeals is that of
the guilty plea, a problem which looms large in misdemeanor as well as in felony cases. Counsel is needed so
that the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so
that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or
prison, and so- that he is treated fairly by the prosecution.
In addition, the volume of misdemeanor cases,4 far
greater in number than felony prosecutions, may create
an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fairness of the result. The Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 128
(1967), states:
"For example, until legislation last year increased
the number of judges, the District of Columbia
Court of General Sessions had four judges to process
the preliminary stages of more than 1,500 felony
cases, 7,500 serious misdemeanor cases, and 38,000
petty offenses and an equal number of traffic offenses per year. An inevitable consequence of
volume that large is the almost total preoccupa4

In 1965, 314,000 defendants were charged with felonies in state
courts, and 24,000 were charged with felonies in federal courts
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 55 (1967). Exclusive of
traffic offenses, however, it is estimated that there are annually
between four and five million court cases involving misdemeanors.
Ibid. And, while there are no authoritative figures, extrapolations
indicate that there are probably between 40.8 and 50 million traffic
offenses each year. Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right
to Counsel, 55 Iowa L Rev 1249, 1201 (1970)

y\-
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tion in such a court with the movement of cases.
The calendar is long, speed often is substituted for
care, and casually arranged out-of-court compromise
too often is substituted for adjudication. Inadequate attention tends to be given to the individual
defendant, whether in protecting his rights, sifting
the facts at Trial, deciding the social risk he presents, or determining how to deal with him after
conviction. The frequent result is futility and failure. As Dean Edward Barrett recently observed:
" 'Wherever the visitor looks at the system, he
finds great numbers of defendants being processed
by harassed and overworked officials. Police have
more cases than they can investigate. Prosecutors
walk into courtrooms to try simple cases as they
take their initial looks at the files. Defense lawyers appear having had no more than time for
hasty conversations with their clients. Judges face
long calendars with the certain knowledge that their
calendars tomorrow and the next day will be, if
anything, longer, and so there is no choice but to
dispose of the cases.
" 'Suddenly it becomes clear that for most defendants in the criminal process, there is scant regard
for them as individuals. They are numbers on
dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on
their way. The gap between the theory and the
reality is enormous.
" 'Very little such observation of the administration of criminal justice in operation is required 'to
reach the conclusion that it suffers from basic ills/ M

Ul, ^

'

That picture is seen in almost every report. "The
misdemeanor trial is characterized by insufficient and
frequently irresponsible preparation on, the part of the
defense, $he prosecution, and the court. Everything is
rush, rush." Tfcllerstein, The Importance of the Mis-
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demeanor Case on Trial and Appeal, 28 The Legal Aid
Brief Case 151, 152 (1970).
There is evidence of the prejudice which results to
misdemeanor defendants from this "assembly-line justice." One study concluded that "[misdemeanants represented by attorneys are five times as likely to emerge
from police court with all charges dismissed as are
defendants who face similar charges without counsel."
American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Counsel for Misdemeanants, Preliminary Report 1 (1970).
We must conclude, therefore, that the problems associated with misdemeanor and petty 5 offenses often
5

Title 18 U. S. C. § 1 defines a petty offense as one in which the
penalty does not exceed imprisonment for six months, or a fine of
not more than S500, or both. Title 18 U. S. C. § 3006A (b) provides
for the appointment of counsel for indigents in all cases "other than
a petty offense." But, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
noted in James v. Heudlcy, 410 F 2d, at 330-331, IS U. S. C.
§ 3006A, which was enacted as the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, contains a congressional plan for furnishing legal representation at federal
expense for certain indigents and does not purport to cover the full
range of constitutional rights to counsel.
Indeed, the Conference Report on the Criminal Justice Act of
1964 made clear the conferees' belief that the right to counsel extends to all offenses, petty and scnou- alike. H. R. Conf. Rep
Xo. 1709, SSth Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
In that connection, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended in 1966r provide in Rule 44 ( a ) : "Every defendant who
is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel
a l i g n e d to represent him at every stage of the proceedings from
his initial appearance before the commissioner or the court through
appeal, unless he waives such appointment."
The Advisory Committee note on Rule 44 says: "Like the original
rule the amended rule provides a right to counsel which is broader
in two respects than that for which compensation is provided in the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964:
"(1) The right extends to petty offenses to be tried in the
district courts, and
"(2) T h e right extends to defendants unable to obtain counsel
for reasons other than financial."

\ U O R R S I N O E R r. H A M L I N
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require the presence of counsel to insure the accused a
fair trial. M R . JUSTICE POWELL suggests that these
problems are raised even in situations where there is no
prospect of imprisonment. Post, at 48. We need not
consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as
regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not
involved, however* for here petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail. And, as we said in Baldwin v. New York,
399 U. S., at 73, "the prospect of imprisonment for
however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or 'petty' matter and may well result
in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his'
renutation. n c
We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
felony, unless he was represented by Counsel at his trial/
That is the view of the Supreme Court of Oregon, with_
wfiich we agree. It said in Stevenson v. Holzmany 254
Ore. 94, 102, 458 P. 2d 414, 418:
"We hold that no person may be deprived of his
c

See Marston v Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691, 696 (ED Va. 1971):
"Any incarceration of over thirty days, more or less, will usually
result in loss of employment, with a consequent substantial detriment
to the defendant and his family."
7
We do not share M R . JUSTICE POWELL'S doubt that the Nation's
legal resources are >uflicient to implement the rule we announce
today. It has been c l i m a t e d that between 1,575 and 2.300 full-time
counsel would be required to represent all indigent nn-demeanants,
excluding traffic offender*.
Note, Dollars and Sen^e of an Expanded
Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa I, Rev 1249, 1260-1261 (1970). These
figures are relatively insignificant when compared to the estimated
355,200 attorneys in the United State.- (Statistical Abstract of the
United States 153 (1971)), a number which is projected to double
by the year 1985. See Ruud, That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment, 58 A. B. A. J 146, 147. Indeed, there are 18,000 new admissions to the bar each year—3,500 more lawyers than are required
to fill the "estimated 14,500 average annual opening.- " Id , at 14S
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liberty who has been denied the assistance of counsel
as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. ^This holding is applicable to all criminal prosecutions, including prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances. The denial of the assistance of counsel will
preclude the imposition of a jail sentence." 8
We do not sit as an ombudsman to direct state courts
how to manage their affairs but only to make clear the
federal constitutional requirement. How crimes should
be classified is largely a state matter, 9 The fact that
traffic charges technically fall within the category of
"criminal prosecutions' 7 does not i ocessarily mean that
many of them will be brought into !hr class 10 where imprisonment actually occurs.
8

Article I, § 9 , of the proposed Rc\i-cd Constitution of Oregon
provides:
" E v e r y person has the right to assistance of counsel in all official
proceedings and dealings with public officers that may materially
affect him. If he cannot afford counsel, he has the right to have
counsel appointed for him in any case m winch he may lose his
liberty."
9
One partial solution to the pioHem oi minor offences may well
be to remove them from thr court »\Mem
The American Bar Association Special Committee on ("rime l'r mention and Control recently recommended, inter alia tint
"Regulation of variom t\pe- ni <onduc i which h i r m no one other
than tho-e m \ o l \ e d (e Lr , puhh« diniiL •! n<'- ( n i n o f i e - addiction,
vagrancy, and deviant se\u d b e h a \ n r ) I ould be taken out of the
courts. The handling of t K '^e nuttot ^ho'ihl he transferred to nonjudicial entities. Mich « <JeTn\ffiratiop M«mer- nuvotic* treatment
centers and social sen ice agencie- The handling of other nonserious offenses, such as housing code and traffic violations, should
be transferred to specialized admmiM ratn e bodie- " ABA Report,
New Perspectives on [Than Cnmi i\ (107lM
Such a solution, of
course, is peculiarly within the p r m m u <>t -late and local legislatures.
10
"Forty thousand traffic charges (anting out of 150,000 nonparking traffic citations) were disposed of by court action in Seattle
during 1964. The study showed, however, that in only about 4,500
cases was there any possibility o- i m p u g n m e n t as the result of a
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The American Bar Association Project on Standards
for Criminal Justice states:
"As a matter of sound judicial administration it
is preferable to disregard the characterization of the
offense as felony, misdemeanor or traffic offense.
Nor is it adequate to require the provision of defense
services for all offenses which carry a sentence to
jail or prison. Often, as a practical matter, such
sentences are rarely if ever imposed for certain types
of offenses, so that for all intents and purposes the
punishment they carry is at most a fine. Thus, the
standard seeks to distinguish those classes of cases
in which there is real likelihood that incarceration
may follow conviction from those types in which
there is no such likelihood. It should be noted that
the standard does not recommend a determination
of the need for counsel in terms of the facts of each
particular case; it draws a categorical line at those
types of offenses for which incarceration as a punishment is a practical possibility/' Providing Defense
Services 40 (Approved Draft 1968).
traffic conviction. In only three kinds of cases was the accused
exposed to any danger of imprisonment: (1) where the offense
charged was hit-and-run, reckless or drunken driving; or (2) where
any additional traffic violation was charged against an individual
subject to a suspended sentence for a previous violation; or
(3) where, whatever the offense charged, the convicted individual
was unable to pay the fine imposed." Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 685, 711'(1968).
Of the 1,2S8.97o people convicted by the City of New York in
1970 for traffic infractions such as jaywalking and speeding, only
24 were fined and imprisoned, given suspended sentences, or jailed.
Criminal Court of the City of New York Annual Report 11 (1970).
Of the 19,187 convicted of more serious traffic offenses, such as
driving under the influence, reckless driving, and leaving the scene
of an accident, 404 (2.1%) were subject to some form of imprisonment. Ibid.

-vy-
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JJnder the rule we announce today, every judge will
know when the trial of a misdemeanor s t a r t s that no
imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law
permits it, unless the accused is represented b y j x m n s e l .
He will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity
of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer
to represent the accused before the trial starts.
T h e run of misdemeanors will not be affected by
today's ruling. B u t in those t h a t end up in the actual
deprivation of a person's liberty, the accused will receive
t h e benefit of "the guiding hand of counsel" so necessary
when one's liberty is in jeopardy.
Reversed.
whom M R . J U S T I C E
DOUGLAS and M R . J U S T I C E STEWART join, concurring.
MR.

JUSTICE

BRENNAN,

with

I join the opinion of the Court and arid only an
observation upon its discussion of legal resources, ante,
at 37 n. 7. Law students as well as practicing attorneys
m a y provide an important source of legal representation
for the indigent. T h e Council on Legal Education for
Professional Responsibility ( C L I C R ) informs us t h a t
more than 125 of the c o u n t r y ^ 147 accredited law schools
have established clinical program^ in which facultysupervised students aid clients in >i variety of civil and
criminal matteib.* C L E P R Newsletter, M a y 1972, p. 2.
These programs supplement practice rules enacted in
3S States authorizing students to piactice law under
prescribed conditions.
Ibid.
Lite the American Bar
Association's Model Student Practice Pule (1969), most
of these regulations permit students ti^ make supervised
*A total of 57 lay school- have .iPo (vt lhhshed clinical programs
in corrections, where law students, under faculty supervision, aid*
prisoners in the preparation of petition.- for post-conviction relief.
C L E P R Newsletter, Ma\ 1972, p 3 Sec 1hntc<l States v Simpson,
141 U fi App. D. C S, lf>-1G, 4'M) V M Ih? ]f,o 170 (1070)
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C. J., concurring in result

court appearances as defense counsel in criminal cases.
C L E P R , State Rules Permitting the Student Practice of
Law: Comparisons and C o m m e n t s 13 (1971). Given the
huge increase in law school enrollments over the past
few years, see R u u d , T h a t Burgeoning Law School E n rollment, 58 A. B. A. J. 146 (1972), I think it plain t h a t
law students can be expected to make a significant contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the representation of the poor in m a n y areas, including cases
reached by today's decision.
M R . C H I E F J U S T I C E BURGER,

concurring in the result.

I agree with much of the analysis in the opinion of
the Court and with M R . J U S T I C E POWELL'S appraisal
of the problems. Were I able to confine my focus solely
to the burden t h a t the States will have to bear in providing counsel, T would be inclined, at this stage of
the development of the constitutional right to counsel,
to conclude t h a t there is much to commend drawing
the line at penalties in excess of six months' confinement.
Yet several cogent factors suggest the infirmities in any
approach t h a t allows confinement for any period without the aid of counsel at trial; any deprivation of liberty
is a serious matter. The issues that must be dealt with
in a trial for a petty offense or a misdemeanor may often
be simpler than those involved in a felony trial and
yet be beyond the capability of a layman, especially
when he is opposed by a law-trained prosecutor. There
is little ground, therefore, to assume that a defendant,
unaided by counsel, will be any more able adequately
to defend himself against the lesser charges t h a t may
involve confinement than more serious charges. Appeal
from a conviction after an uncounseled trial is not likely
to be of much help to a defendant since t h e die is usually
cast when judgment is entered on an uncounseled trial
record.

•
AFFIDAVIT OF POVERTY

• • . N. EJ

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
KANE COUNTY, UTAH

Arden M. Barlow, being first duly sworn deposes and says:
W(lJj)jJ/?fiU;1.
That my name is as stated above, and that my address is Box ^ 0
HHdale, Utah 84784.
2.
That by virtue of the Injunction and requirement of Article I, Sec
10, Paragraph 1, Clause 5 of the Constitution of the United States as
relates to States and tender in payment of debts; the Coinage Acts of April
2, 1792 and February 28, 1878 and the International Monetary Acts of July
31, 1944 and that of the 73rd Congress, House Joint Resolution 192, dated
June 5, 1933, later codified and now 31 U.S.C. Sec. 463, the Affiant along
with all of the Affiants, fellow American Citizens, have been reduced to
peonage (involuntary servitude) in violation of the Bill of Rights to the
Constitution of the United States.
3.
That by virtue of said HJR 192, Congress effectively placed a
Moratorium on debt, and by said Act forced every citizen into perpetual
credit slavery, and precluded every citizen from paying his debts, for the
simple reason that there is no money, identifiable as such, in circulation
in the United States today.
4.
That it should be elementary to everyone that "tender for all
debts" and "tender in payment of debts" are two distinctly different
propositions.
5.
That being thus unable to possess substance at the Common Law
commonly referred to as "Standard Dollars Lawful Money", and having none in
my pockets or any other possessions of the Affiant at the time of making of
this Affidavit, and without waiving or abandoning the Bill of Rights or any
of the Affiants objections to equitable Jurisdictions, that with respect to
Standard Dollars Lawful Money", the Affiant, Arden M. Barlow, must declare
to one and all, to the public at large, that he is a pauper.
6.
That said declaration is made in accordance with the Affiant's
sincerely held religious, moral, and conscientious beliefs, that the
Affiant cannot and will not accept or condone mere "Choses in Action" which
is nothing more than paper "evidences of debt" as a lawful substitute for
"Standard
Dollars Lawful Money", notwithstanding the expediencies of
certain mercantile or government interests.^

Arden M. Barlow
SUBSCRIBED TO and sworn before me this 16

day

Notary P u b ! i c

— HV
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IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
KANE COUNTY, CRIMINAL DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
O R D E R
Plaintiff,
vs.
ARDEN M. BARLOW,
Case No. 87-CR-0008
Defendant

The above-captioned matter came on regularly before the
above-entitled Court, on May 15, 1987, for hearing of the
Plaintiff's Motion for Determination of Indigency.

The Plaintiff

was present and represented by the Kane County Attorney.

The

Defendant was present in person.
The Court, being fully advised in the premises and good
cause appearing, entered its findings and made the following
order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Plaintiff's Motion for Determination of Indigency be, and the
same is hereby denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendant's oral Motion for Counsel of His Choice be, and the
same is hereby denied.
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that this matter
is hereby scheduled for hearing of motions commencing on May 29,

v?-

tate vs. Barlow
lase No. 87-CR-0008
irder
age 2

987, at 9:00 o'clock a.m.

All motions to be heard that date

ust be filed with the Clerk of the Court on or before May 26,
987.
DATED this

^~ '

day of May, 1987
BY TH

COURT:

DA^ID L. MOWER, Circuit Judge.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this

$9

day of May, 1987, I

iled a true, full and correct copy of the above and foregoing
DER ON MOTIONS, with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid,
:

Arden M. Barlow, P.O. Box 100, Hildale, Utah
V

-yt IM/r

84784.

Y I <-4M~4UJ
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Case N o .

37-CR-onria

TITLE (Parties Present)

COUNSEL (Counsel Present)
PI a i l i c i f f ,

vs.
.••r...L-;i

[•,.

_,.; r";

-JV

f i : 5 ••.':!'! t , 1

bofei id a n t

MINUTE ENTRY
Proceedings Before the Court
ii-jarinc' on a'l 1 motions and t r i i i l

setting

(

)

SMALL CLAIMS

(

)

CIVIL

(

)

CRIMINAL

(

)

TRAFFIC

(

)

DIV. WILDLIFE RESOURCES
and STATE BOATING ACT

Defendant's demand for rights Sua Sponte was not ruled on by the court.

Defendant'

demand for dismissal* no cause for action and failure of Prime Facia case was den 1 e
oy the courc.

notice dm demand for Dismissal-Lack of lawful money to pay fine(s)

if assessed was caken under advisement and will be ruled on if the court finds it
ueeos to be a: some future time.

Notice and Demand for Tenth Circuit Court rules

was answers and discussed with the defendant by the court.

Defendant's demand for

veniremenc to number twelve (12) was denied fay the court and if tin's request is mad
again, defendant will be found in contempt and the court will consdcier fining him.
Matter is See for a Jury Trial on July 10, 19o7.

''

'

V

Court Clerk

i___

•__

v

-• -

^ 0

•

_^:r:_

Circuit Court Judge

— .57-

IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
KANE COUNTY, CRIMINAL DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON MOTIONS

vs
\RDEN M. BARLOW,
Defendant.

Case No. 87-CR-0008

The above-captioned matter came on regularly before the
ibove-entitled Court, on May 29, 1987, for hearing of the
)efendant!s Demand for Rights Sua Sponte, Demand for Dismissal
lo Cause of Action and Failure of Prime Facia Case, Demand for
r

enirement to Number Twelve, Demand for Dismissal - Lack of

,awful Money to Pay Fine(s) If Assessed, and Demand for Tenth
lircuit Court Rules.

The Plaintiff was present and represented

y the Kane County Attorney.

The Defendant was present in

erson.
After reviewing the evidence presented by the parties,
earing the arguments of the parties,, and being fully advised in
he premises and good cause appearing therefore, the Court
itered its findings and made the following orders:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Pendant's Demand for Dismissal - No Cause of Action and Failure
: Prime Facia Case be, and the same is hereby denied.

- sa.-

State vs. Barlow
Case No. 87-CR-0008
Order on Motions
Page 2

IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the
Defendant's Demand for Venirement to Number Twelve be, and the
same is hereby denied.

The Defendant will be found in contempt

and the Court will consider fining him if this request is made
again.
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the
Defendant's Demand for Dismissal - Lack of Lawful Money to Pay
Fine(s) if Assessed, is hereby taken under advisement and will be
ruled on if the Court finds it needs to be at some future date.
Demand for Tenth Circuit Court Rules was answered and
discussed with the Defendant by the Court.
No ruling is made at this time on the Defendant's
Demand titled Rights Sua Sponte.

The same is continued as being

premature.
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that this matter
is hereby scheduled for jury trial commencing on July 10, 1987,
at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
DATED this

//

day of June, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID-'L. MOWER, Circuit Judge.
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IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
KANE COUNTY, CRIMINAL DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Plaintiff,
vs.
\RDEN M. BARLOW,
Case No. 87-CR-0008
Defendant

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY:
Attached hereto are Jury Instructions, numbered 1 to
lumber

inclusive, as given by the Court in this case.
DATED this

ID

day of July, 1987.

DAVID, i/
jj MOWER, Circuit Judge.

— £o_

INSTRUCTION II
It is the duty of this Court

to instruct you in the

law that applies to this case and in the procedures to be
followed.
It is your duty to follow the law regardless of what
you believe it is or ought to be.
It is your exclusive right and responsibility to determine the facts in this case after considering all the evidence.
You are to be governed only by the evidence introduced
in this trial and the law which I will state to you.

You are

expected to act conscientiously and calmly in weighing the
evidence and applying the law of the case to reach a just verdict/ regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be.

-£/-

INSTRUCTION NO. J j
You are instructed that in

the Information the Defendant is charged

with the violation of Section 76-8-504(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated, which reads
as follows:
A person is guilty of a class B Misdemeanor, when, with the intent to
deceive a public servant in the performance of his official function, he:
(a) Makes any written false statement which he does not believe to be
true: or
(b) Knowingly creates a false impression in a written application
for any pecuniary or other benefit by ommitting information necessary
to prevent statements therein from being misleading.
In order to establish the commission of any crime charged, the State
must prove certain essential facts which the statutes of this state define
as being the necessary elements constituting the crime charged.

In the case

now before the Court, proof of the commassion of the crime of WRITTEN
FALSE STATEMENT, as charged in the InloimatLon, requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of each of the following elements:
1. That the offense, if any, occurred in Kane County, State of Utah.
2.

That the offense, if any, occurred on or about the 13th day of
April, 1987, although the exact date is immaterial.

3.
1

That the Defendant, ARDEN M. BARLOW, did, with[i^tentTto deceive
a public

-£*.-

Jury Instruction No. j^£
Page 2

servant in the performance of his/her
official function, make any written
false statement which he^did not believe
to be true, or
"~
4.

Defendant did knowingly create a false
impression in a \rcij^jm^j^p^^
jmy_ pecuniary or^ther benefits by
omitting information necessary to
prevent statements therein from being
misleading.

The Defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to the
charge of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT as set forth in the Information
and thereby denies each and every one of the essential facts set
forth above in this instruction.

The Defendant's plea of not

guilty thus casts upon the State the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt each and all of these essential facts set forth
in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, or each and all of the essential facts
set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, and 4, above. .
Therefore, if you find from the evidence received
during the trial that the State has proven each and every one of
either set of the three essential facts set forth above, beyond a
reasonable doubt, it would be your duty to find the Defendant
"guilty" of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT.

On the other hand, if you

find that by the evidence received during the trial the State has
failed to prove any one of these essential facts beyond a
reasonable doubt, it would be your duty to find the Defendant
"not guilty" of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT.
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IN THE TENTH CIHCUIT COUBT, STATE OP UTAHIN THE C'c<~'! • "
KANE COUNTY, TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH

.

CASE NO. ^ 7 - C ^ ^ . O O O ^

Plaintiff,
vs,
Notice and Demand for
Stay of Execution
Pending Appeal

fcrden M. Barlow,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Defendantf appearing specially and not generally
herein, to demand that the Court grant a "Stay of Execution of
Sentence" pertaining tq this persons pending appeal.
The Defendant reminds the Court that this free and Natural
person does not grant Jurisdiction over this person, and continually
challenges the Jurisdiction pf the Court over the subject matter
and Its capability to effect a remedy In this case.
Although the Defendant denies the Court Jurisdiction, the
Defendant readily recognizes certain powers of the Court that the
Court can and does exercise whether Jurisdiction Is valid or not*
Dated this /^{th day <bf /fi^dh

19^.

Respectfully submitted,

uh!b.ffl&adL^>
In PROPRIA PERSONA
It is so ordered this

day of

f
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IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
KANE COUNTY, CRIMINAL DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT,
SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT

vs.
ARDEN M. BARLOW,
Case No. 87-CR-0008
Defendant,

The above-captioned matter came on regularly for
sentencing before the above-entitled Court on Friday, the 14th
day of August, 1987, at Kanab, Utah.

The Plaintiff was present

and represented by the Kane County Attorney.
appeared in person.

The Defendant

Sentencing recommendations were made in open

court by the Kane County Attorney and the Defendant.
The Court, having heard the recommendations of the
parties and being fully advised in the premises entered judgment
as follows:
JUDGMENT
IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant, ARDEN M. BARLOW, has
been convicted upon a plea of not guilty and a finding of guilty
of the offense of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT, a class B misdemeanor,
as charged in the Information, and the Court, having asked if the
Defendant had anything to s;^ why judgment should not be
pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown
or appearing to the Court,

-ct-
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IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant is guilty as charged
and convicted.
SENTENCE
THE SENTENCE OF THIS COURT is that the Defendant ARDEN
M. BARLOW, be confined and imprisoned in the Kane County Jail for
a term of sixty (60) days and be fined the sum of FOUR HUNDRED
DOLLARS ($400.00), together with a 25% surcharge of ONE HUNDRED
DOLLARS ($100.00).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that fifty (50) days of the jail
sentence be suspended.
CONTEMPT
The Court, upon finding the Defendant, ARDEN M. BARLOW,
in contempt, sentenced him jm be confined and imprisoned in the
Kane County Jail for ten (10) days, to run concurrently with

the,

jail term imposed for the offense of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT, and
fined the sum of THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($300.00).
Commitment shall issue forthwith.
COMMITMENT
IT IS ORDERED that Joseph T. Gonzales, Sheriff of Kane
County, State of Utah, take the said Defendant, ARDEN M. BARLOW,
into his custody and confine him in accordance with the terms of
this document.

State vs. Barlow
Case No. 87-CR-0008
Judgment, Sentence and Commitment
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APPEAL
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the Defendant
have thirty (30) days in which to appeal the judgment of this
Court in the manner provided by law.
DATED this

/ I

day of August, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND
COMMITMENT, to Arden M. Barlow at the Kane County Courthouse,
70 North Main, Kanab, Utah, and Sheriff Joseph T. Gonzales, Kane
County Sheriff's Office, 70 North Main, Kanab, Utah on this
day of August, 1987.

-tot-

IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
KANE COUNTY, TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER ON MOTIONS
Plaintiff,
vs
ARDEN M. BARLOW,
Case No. 87-TF-0004
Defendant

The above-captioned matter came on regularly before the
above-entitled Court, on April 24, 1987, for hearing of the
Defendant's Demand for Rights Sua Sponte, Demand for Affidavit in
Support of Formal Complaint, Demand for Dismissal - Statute
Exceeds the Police Power of the State, Demand for Venirement to
Number Twelve, Demand for the Plaintiff to Show Constraining Need
or in the Alternative to Dismiss, Demand to Dismiss - Lack of
Lawful Money to Pay Fines, If Assessed, Demand to Dismiss - No
Remedy Available, No Jail Possible, and Demand for Counsel of
Choice.

The Plaintiff was present and represented by the Kane

County Attorney.

The Defendant was present in person.

After reviewing the evidence presented by the parties,
hearing the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the
premises and good cause appearing therefore, the Court entered
its findings and made the following orders:

_£9-
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendant's Demand for Affidavit in Support of Formal Complaint
be, and the same is hereby denied.
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the
Defendant's Demand for Dismissal - Statute Exceeds the Police
Power of the State be, and the same is hereby denied.
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the
Defendant's Demand for Venirement to Number Twelve (12) be, and
the same is hereby denied.
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the
Defendant's Demand for the Plaintiff to Show Constraining Need or
in the Alternative to Dismiss be, and the same is hereby denied.
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the
Defendant's Demand to Dismiss - Lack of Lawful Money to Pay
Fines, if Assessed be, and the same is hereby denied.
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the
Defendant's Demand for Counsel of Choice be, and the same is
hereby denied.
No ruling is made at this time on the Defendant's
Demand titled Rights Sua Sponte and Demand to Dismiss, No Remedy
Available, No Jail Possible, the same is continued as being
premature.

-7o-
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Portions of Defendant's Subpoena Duces Tecum is
granted, and Trooper Robertson is ordered to make copies of his
log and radar manual available for Defendant's inspection and
copying, and further said trooper is ordered to allow Defendant
to view the subject radar device and to instruct Defendant as to
the method and use of the same and the Court having recessed for
said purpose, and the Court having reconvened and said trooper
having reported to the Court that he had fully complied with said
order and that Defendant had made said viewing inspection and
copying, and that said inspection had been provided to Defendant;
the Court finds that Defendant has been provided with the
discovery requested, therefore, no further discovery order is
made herein..
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that this matter
is hereby scheduled for jury trial commencing on July 10, 1987,
at 10:00 o'clock a.m.
DATED this

^ I

day of May, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

l ^)jM^
DAVID'L. MOWER, Circuit Judge.
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IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OP UTAH
KANE COUNTY, TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH

CASE NO.

r7-TfrrpOOf

Plaintiff,
va,
Notice and Demand for
Stay of Execution
Pending Appeal

Arden M. Barlow,
Defendant.
.)

COMES NOW the Defendant, appearing specially and not generally
herein, to demand that the Court grant a *Stay of Execution of
Sentence1* pertaining tq this persons pending appeal.
The Defendant reminds the Court that this free and Natural
person does not grant Jurisdiction over this person, and continually
challenges the jurisdiction pf the Court over the subject matter
and Its capability to effect a remedy In this case.
Although the Defendant denies the Court jurisdiction, the
Defendant readily recognizes certain powers of the Court that the
Court can and does exercise whether Jurisdiction Is valid or not.
Dated this/^th day ^bf

fau^yi

19^.

Respectfully submitted,

{^^>^
In PROPRIA PERSONA
It is so ordered this

day of

.. 19

Judfire

7$

IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
KANE COUNTY, TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT

KAtt£ COOT.7, \jf/,-:
° ^ (Vll^ /^f

THE STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
ARDEN M. BARLOW,
Case No. 87-TF-0004
Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came before the
above-entitled Court sitting at Kanab, Utah, on Friday, the 14th
day of August, 1987, for the hearing of the Defendant's Demand
for Stay of Execution Pending Appeal.

The Plaintiff was present

and represented by the Kane County Attorney.

The Defendant

appeared in person.
The Court, having been fully advised in the premises,
and having found good cause therefore, entered the following
order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendant's Demand for Stay of Execution Pending Appeal be, and
the same is hereby denied.
DATED this

day of August, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

DAVirrX. MOWER, Circuit Judge.

-7Y-
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IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAHK-*' - Cv,' " ,
KANE COUNTY, TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
Plaintiff,
vs.
ARDEN M. BARLOW,
Case No. 87-TF-0004
Defendant.

The above-captioned matter came on regularly for
sentencing before the above-entitled Court on Friday, the 14th
day of August, 1987, at Kanab, Utah.

The Plaintiff was present

and represented by the Kane County Attorney.
appeared in person.

The Defendant

Sentencing recommendations were made in open

court by the Kane County Attorney and the Defendant.
The Court, having heard the recommendations of the
parties and being fully advised in the premises entered judgment
as follows:
JUDGMENT
IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant, ARDEN M. BARLOW, has
been convicted upon a plea of not guilty and a finding of guilty
of the offense of EXCEEDING THE MAXIMUM SPEED LIMIT, a class B
misdemeanor, as charged in the Information, and the Court, having
asked if the Defendant had anything to say why judgment should
not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being
shown or appearing to the Court,

State vs. Barlow
Case No. 87-TF-0004
Judgment and Sentence
Page 2

IT IS ADJUDGED that the Defendant is guilty as charged
and convicted.
SENTENCE
THE SENTENCE OF THIS COURT is that the Defendant ARDEN
M. BARLOW, be fined the sum of SIXTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($65.00) for
the offense of EXCEEDING THE MAXIMUM SPEED LIMIT, a class B
misdemeanor.
APPEAL
IT IS THE FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT that the Defendant
have thirty (30) days in which to appeal the judgment of this
Court in the manner provided by law.
DATED this

Ij

day of August, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

oUJju—.
DAVI-fiTL. MOWER, C i r c u i t J u d g e .

£/3#7

MAILING CERTIFICATE

W
jj

I hereby certify that on this

day of August,

1987, I mailed a true, full and correct copy of the above and
foregoing JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE, with first-class postage thereon
fully prepaid, to: Arden M. Barlow, P.O. Box 100, Hildale, Utah
84784.
ML.
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